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The institutions charged with maintaining the international financial structure since World War II
have come under attack for their failure to anticipate and adequately respond to the financial crises
in Russia and Asia in 1998. Critics from the major industrial nations who underwrite and direct
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are now proposing reforms for the two
institutions, and some are questioning their fundamental strategies and missions.
The IMF and World Bank the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs) set up at Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, in 1944 maintained a world financial order characterized by monetary cooperation
and stable currencies pegged to the US dollar. They also encouraged more open trade relations,
but Bretton Woods economics accepted the need for national controls on capital flows and trade to
protect employment. Full employment, a concern carried over from the Great Depression, was a
priority, not free trade and mobility of international capital. However, since the 1970s, the ideal of
full employment has given way to low inflation and the free movement of capital as major goals of
the system.
Liberalization of the system meant abandoning fixed currencies to allow currency markets to set
values. The prime beneficiaries of the international financial order would no longer be national
economies, their work forces and consumers, but investors, currency speculators, and others less
directly connected or not connected at all to national economies. The BWIs developed lending
programs linked to a liberal economic formula for assisting developing nations.
The formula, often called the Washington Consensus because it reflected the prevailing US
economic-development theories, came increasingly into play as foreign-debt burdens multiplied
in the 1980s. The formula, bundled into the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), included
government spending cuts, privatization, promotion of exports, labor flexibility, and elimination of
trade barriers and capital controls. In Latin America, as elsewhere, neoliberal globalism became a
fixture as governments sought to extricate themselves from the effects of their asphyxiating foreign
debts.
The total Latin American and Caribbean foreign debt reached US$700 billion by 1998, and
governments were spending an average of one-third of export earnings on debt service. Peruvian
economist Oscar Ugarteche writes that gains from the SAPs were mostly illusory. "The structuraladjustment policies that sought to close the trade deficit, increase domestic savings, stabilize
exchange rates, and promote economic growth have not succeeded on any of these fronts if one
compares the figures with the experience of the three decades between 1950 and 1980. There is only
an improvement if one compares the data with the economically depressed 1980s."
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Such criticism became common in developing countries in the 1990s but was seldom heard from the
industrialized nations. IMF blames crony capitalism for crises In the wake of the Asia crisis, analysis
of what went wrong centered on crony capitalism, corruption in recipient governments, and panicky
investors who fled foreign markets.
Less attention was paid to the IMF formula or how the international financial system was being
structured. Until it went into recession, Japan received praise for the close ties between its
government planners and tightly organized megabusinesses operating with capital and trade
controls practices very much like those the IMF calls crony capitalism.
Writing in The Nation magazine, John Gray, author of False Dawn: The Delusions of Global
Capitalism, said, "Economic collapse in Russia is the first unequivocal sign of the breakdown
of global laissez-faire....Contrary to triumphalist and frequently racist interpretations current in
the Western media, the Asian depression does not signify a crisis of Asian capitalism...but a fastdeveloping crisis of global capitalism....The myth that Asia's economic difficulties are a symptom of
the peculiar vices of its 'crony capitalism' is no longer credible."
Doug Henwood, editor of the Left Business Observer, wrote that the real IMF agenda is "to
dismantle Asian governance systems and replace them with US-style stock market-centered
systems." Another criticism of the IMF is that its top echelon made up primarily of Ph.D.s in
economics has little direct experience with the countries to which it dictates reforms. An example
is the encounter in 1998 between then IMF director Michel Camdessus and Indonesia's president
Suharto.
Camdessus told Suharto that he had to immediately drink the IMF cocktail of reforms that included
the elimination of price supports on staple goods. The subsequent price increases produced riots
and contributed to Suharto's ouster. Critics say Camdessus' insistence on blaming crony capitalism
Suharto reneged on a promise to break up monopolies controlled by his family missed the point that
the IMF ignored the negative impact of its own nostrums on the economy. While often proclaiming
the need to do something about poverty, the IMF formula, which included interest-rate hikes,
fiscal-deficit reduction, and slashing government payrolls, were prescriptions for recession and
unemployment.
At the same time, the IMF approved new structural-adjustment loans whose repayment would take
priority over social programs. Some IMF defenders point out that the Washington Consensus failed
in part because of constraints placed on the institutions by its major member states, especially the
US. Laden with political tasks set by foreign-policy interests of powerful G-7 states, the IMF went
along with bailout packages it did not necessarily support. It was the US Treasury Department, over
Camdessus' objections, that organized the futile US$17 billion bailout to Russia in 1998.
The World Bank has not escaped blame either. It loaned the Suharto regime US$25 billion in recent
years despite the regime's known corruption. The bank accepted at face value Suharto's claims of
economic progress and viewed Indonesia as an economic miracle. An internal report leaked to the
press in early 1999 blamed World Bank staff in Jakarta for ignoring reality. "Perhaps the bank tried
to preserve the image of the Indonesian miracle for too long," the report said. A previous World
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Bank report said 20% to 30% of Indonesia's development funds had gone into private pockets as had
a similar percentage of World Bank funds.
Opposition to the Washington Consensus, including from organized labor, has been strong in Latin
America but has not succeeded in imposing a workable alternative. Even in Guatemala, Nicaragua,
and El Salvador, where the former guerrilla left organizations were strong enough to move into
the arena as political parties, their critique of globalism and appeal to labor has not brought them
to power. Instead of a clients' revolt against the Washington Consensus, it was the industrialized
countries, stung by the apparent helplessness of the BWI formula to keep Russia and the Asian
economies upright, that pressed for change. US calls for modest reforms At the 1998 annual meeting
of the IMF and World Bank, the US and Britain began talking about a new "architecture" for the
global financial system.
The Clinton administration opposes any radical reforms such as a Japanese suggestion for an Asian
bailout fund independent of the US that would exact much less rigid requirements than does the
IMF. One proposal for fixing the battered IMF is to give it independence from the US and other
major underwriting states so it could act more like an independent central bank than an extension of
US policy. However, the US has countered with a "new-openness" plan that would feature greater
financial disclosure by private institutions about their loan portfolios.
Former Treasury secretary Robert Rubin said investors should pay part of the bailout costs to
increase their share of investment risks and slow capital flight. "Private-sector burden-sharing is
critical, not only because there will not be sufficient official money for all circumstances, but also
because it is absolutely essential in inducing market discipline," Rubin said. Critics of the ClintonRubin reform say it is a strategy to head off national controls on currency speculation favored by
Japan and some Southeast Asia countries such as Malaysia.
The US proposals did not touch the IMF's rigid SAP requirements, suggesting instead a shift from
emergency bailouts to establishing credit lines for healthy economies to use before troubles start.
In essence, the Clinton plan is a shift away from the IMF's focus on crony capitalism and to blame
speculators with a herd mentally who take capital out of economies in a stampede. William Greider
wrote in The Nation in October 1998 that tinkering would not bring the global system back to
normal.
"There will be no return to normal, not in the terms that financiers and economists envision," wrote
Greider. "The global system will either be reformed in fundamental ways or we will watch passively
as the destabilizing dynamics of unregulated markets continue to deliver random destruction
around the world, compounding the loss and misery for innocent bystanders." UN body says the
IMF formula is wrong Last year the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) entered
the discussion with a critique of the IMF economic model. In its 1998 report, UNCTAD blamed the
Russian and Asia crises directly on the IMF formula.
UNCTAD consultant Jan Kregel said Latin America "must not continue believing that it will resolve
its problems by reducing the role played by the government, increasing the weight of market
forces, privatizing public enterprises, raising interest rates, and defending local currencies." What is
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needed are capital controls, systems for managing debt repayment, and transparency in monetary
matters, Kregel said. He called the Mexican recovery after its 1995 currency crisis "transient." It is
likely, though, that the apparent success of the Mexican bailout convinced the Treasury Department
and the IMF that billion-dollar transfusions would have similar stabilizing effects elsewhere.
A 1998 World Bank report roundly criticized the IMF-US decision to force interest rates up in Asian
countries to protect their currencies. Although Asian interest rates eventually came down, they did
so at the cost of recession, high unemployment, and massive numbers of bankruptcies. The IMF
solution stabilized a situation created by speculation and careless banking practices but damaged
other areas of the economy that had nothing to do with the original problem, said World Bank
chief economist Joseph Stiglitz. He laid the blame for the Russian debacle on the IMF's focus on
macroeconomic indicators and privatization, ignoring that neither Russia nor many developing
countries had the regulatory and juridical institutions in place to handle freewheeling private buyers
of public property.
As part of the re-examination of the Washington Consensus, the World Bank and the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB) have re-emphasized social policy. Both institutions have
admitted that SAPs have not reduced poverty and dependence (see NotiSur, 1999-10-22). They
are calling for a return to government regulation to recover from decades of IMF-imposed state
modernization. Both institutions have issued reports recommending more regulation of financial
institutions, an end to privatizations that result in private monopolies, greater expenditure on social
programs, and massive debt cancellation for the most indebted countries under the World Bank's
Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).
In November, Camdessus resigned after 13 years in his post. He said the resignation was for
personal reasons. The US appears ready to assume a greater role in choosing his successor than it
has in the past. The New York Times quoted a Treasury Department official as saying, "The stakes
are higher now because the fund's profile is so much higher. There is also more disagreement
than ever between the US preference for small reforms and some European opinion in favor of
major overhaul." [Sources: Spanish News Service EFE, 06/30/98; Fortune, 05/11/98, 09/07/98; El
Nuevo Herald, 09/03/98, 09/30/98; The Nation, 10/01/98; Inter Press Service, 09/16/98, 02/14/99;
Associated Press, 10/03/98, 02/14/99; The Tico Times, (Costa Rica), 06/30/99; Spanish News Service
EFE, 09/30/98, 06/30/99; Oscar Ugarteche, The Structural Adjustment Stranglehold, and Doug
Henwood, The Americanization of Global Finance, NACLA Report on the Americas, 07/08/99;
Notimex, 09/24/98, 06/30/99, 09/24/99; Reuters, 09/25/99; The Economist (London), 09/18/99, 09/25/99;
Ian Vasquez, Repairing the Lender-Borrower Relationship in International Finance, Foreign Policy
Briefing, the Cato Institute, 09/27/99; The New York Times, 07/06/98, 08/28/98, 10/01/98, 10/02/98,
10/03/98, 10/04/98, 10/07/98, 10/08/98, 12/03/98, 11/10/99]
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